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USS Scorpion SSN-589 Part Two


USS Scorpion SSN-589

DISCLAIMER

All of the information in this article comes from unclassified sources. In those instances where the I know more accurate information due to my security clearance and service in the United States Navy submarine force I have used the published unclassified information instead. I do this to protect the lives and missions of those men and women currently serving in the United States submarine force.

USS Scorpion

USS Scorpion SSN-589 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

USS SCORPION … WHERE ARE YOU?

As stated in part 1 the USS Scorpion had been attempting to contact SUBLANT without success, but did contact the Naval Communications Station Nea Makri, Greece (which forwarded the messages to SUBLANT).

Sometime after 21 May 1968, SUBLANT supposedly sent messages to USS Scorpion that required the Scorpion to respond. SUBLANT received no response from the USS Scorpion.

It is true that submarines at sea operate on a radio silence order. However, it is not unusual for submarines to be required to send radio messages (position reports, mission reports, and etc.). When the USS Scorpion was declared overdue a SUBMISS report was issued to all naval ships at sea in the Atlantic Ocean that required all United States submarines to surface and send a radio message with their position, to SUBLANT. This SUBMISS report would be used to account for all American submarines making sure no other submarines were missing, and as preparation for coordinating naval ships to conduct a search for the missing submarine.

Submarines do not ignore orders to respond to radio messages. If a submarine is on a particular mission which requires their position to be covert, they will clear DATUM (withdraw to an area near commercial traffic lanes) and then respond as required. United States submarines never ignore a message from higher authority that requires them to send a message in response.

The USS Scorpion was going into the shipyard at Norfolk after it returned from patrol. The torpedomen were disarming the torpedoes during the transit back to Norfolk, in preparation for offloading all weapons at the Norfolk Naval Base, before entering the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. As USS Scorpion neared the coast of the United States, she would have sent a message to SUBLANT with additional information concerning the work to be done on Scorpion while in the shipyard (any additional services or work not already scheduled, that the ship would require, as well as any additional services that would be required at the Norfolk Naval Base). Also, as the USS Scorpion approached Norfolk, Virginia on 27 May 1968, on the surface, the ship would have sent a message with their expected rendezvous time at the position where the Scorpion would meet the pilot boat, so they could pick up the harbor pilot for entering the Norfolk harbor. None of these expected messages from Scorpion were sent from the Scorpion.

Officially, the first concern by the navy for Scorpion was when Submarine Squadron Six (the squadron Scorpion belonged too) did not receive a message from Scorpion about the harbor pilot. It was at this time that the squadron first contacted SUBLANT. As the arrival time of Scorpion passed (1 PM Norfolk time), Scorpion’s submarine squadron again contacted SUBLANT. At 3:15 PM Norfolk time (1915Z or 7:15 PM in military time at Greenwich mean time) SUBLANT sent out a flash message on the Fleet Broadcast System. This message went out to all naval bases and naval ships in the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. The message was:

“Executed Event SUBMISS at 271915Z for USS Scorpion ETA NORVA 271700Z … All submarine units surface or remain surfaced until this message cancelled. Units in port prepare to get underway on one hour’s notice …”

What this means in civilian language is, USS Scorpion was expected in Norfolk, Virginia at 1 PM local time on the 27th (5 PM Greenwich mean time) and did not arrive. At 3:15 PM local time on the 27th (7:15 PM Greenwich mean time) all submarines at sea were ordered to surface and send a position report to SUBLANT. All naval ships in port should get ready to go to sea in one hour. SUBLANT was taking the first step towards having all ships in the Atlantic Fleet scour the ocean for the USS Scorpion.

Bow section of the sunken Scorpion containing ...

Bow section of the sunken Scorpion containing two nuclear torpedoes on the sea floor. US Navy photo. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

On 30 October 1968, the USNS Mizar found the USS Scorpion 240 nautical miles southwest of the Azores in 9,000 feet of water. The controversies have grown ever since.

Scorpion Sunk

Scorpion Sunk (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

US Navy photo of Scorpion wreck (bow), by Bath...

US Navy photo of Scorpion wreck (bow), by Bathyscaphe Trieste (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Navy photo of Scorpion's stern (wreck)

Navy photo of Scorpion’s stern (wreck) (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Sail Scorpion

Sail Scorpion (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

A TALE OF TWO AUTHORS

According to author Ed Offley (in his book Scorpion Down), the navy started a secret search to find the sunken Scorpion days before it was expected at Norfolk. Stephen Johnson (in his book Silent Steel), says this is ludicrous because SUBLANT was not surprised that Scorpion ignored a message requiring Scorpion to reply. Unfortunately neither of these men are submariners or submarine veterans. If they were, they would know that Scorpion would not ignore a message that required them to send a radio response. They would also know that SUBLANT would not automatically assume Scorpion was sunk because it failed to respond to such a message.

It would have been possible for SUBLANT to believe Scorpion was having problems with its radio (remember when Scorpion got to Rota, Spain all its radio equipment was down), or that Scorpion was disabled and on the surface. If SUBLANT believed either of those possibilities it would have been normal for SUBLANT to have ships in the area of Scorpion’s intended track (back to the United States) redirected to Scorpion’s track to look for Scorpion, as they passed through the area. However, this did not happen.

Mr. Offley makes the case that a Soviet Echo II class submarine stalked and sank the USS Scorpion. If we are to follow this train of thought, then Scorpion picked up an Echo II class Soviet submarine trailing it. The Scorpion could not get away from the Echo II, and radioed into SUBLANT that it could not break trail. Then SUBLANT sent the Scorpion (with the Echo II following it) on a highly sensitive mission to spy on a Soviet task force near a SOSUS hydrophone array near the Canary Islands. Really. Not a very good way to conduct clandestine surveillance on a Cold War adversary.

According to published characteristics of these two submarines, the Scorpion had a maximum speed of 33 knots and the Echo II had a maximum speed of 24.2 knots. To break trail the Scorpion would merely have to drive at its maximum speed for several hours because the Echo II class submarine would be unable to keep up. SUBLANT would not send a submarine that was being trailed to perform a covert surveillance mission. What SUBLANT would have done is to clear an underwater lane for Scorpion and ordered her to flank speed (33 knots) for several hours to break trail. Then Scorpion would be ordered to slow down and insure they had lost the Echo II before going on its new mission.

Mr. Johnson also disagrees with Mr. Offley’s Scorpion/Echo II scenario. Mr. Johnson states that an Echo II (one of the Soviet Navy’s best submarines at the time) was too slow and noisy to engage Scorpion, and that the best Soviet underwater weapons were also ineffective against the Scorpion because all Scorpion had to do was to out run the weapon.

Mr. Johnson is correct, but that does not mean the most capable always win. If this were true, a handful of Greeks could never have held off a Persian army that outnumbered them by more than 100:1. Also, what about France and Germany in 1940; France had the largest, best trained, and best-equipped army in the world in 1940. Germany, on paper, was no match for any European nation and certainly no match for France. Yet, the Germany Army overran France so swiftly that even the German Army was surprised at how fast they defeated the French military. The Soviet submarine commander would also know he was at a disadvantage, and would wait for an opportunity that gave him the best odds. Ask any submariner or submarine veteran and they will tell you that any adversary is treated as a real threat to their own ship, no matter the odds.

So, how was it that SUBLANT supposedly knew the Scorpion was sunk in the mid Atlantic Ocean? Well, Mr. Offley states the Soviet Union sank the Scorpion as revenge for sinking one of their Golf class submarines. Then they told the United States government what they did and where the Scorpion was located. First, the US Navy did not sink a Golf class submarine. Second, if the Soviet Union wanted to sink an American submarine, they would not do that while the American submarine was in international waters, that would be an act of war. The Soviet Union would wait for an American submarine that was in Soviet Union territorial waters and sink that submarine. In this scenario, it would be the Americans that committed an act of war, and the Soviet Union would be only defending its own territorial waters.

Mr. Johnson also, does not believe that the Soviets told America where the Scorpion was located. Mr. Johnson points out that when the above mentioned Golf class submarine was lost, the Soviets could not find it. So how could they find the Scorpion? What Mr. Johnson does not say is that the Soviets were looking more than 1,000 miles to the north of where the Golf class submarine had sunk. Simply put, the Soviets were looking where the Golf class submarine was supposed to be on patrol. However, the Golf class submarine was out of its patrol area. There are theories on the loss of this Golf class submarine, but officially we will never know why a Soviet submarine with nuclear ballistic missiles was more than 1,000 miles south of its patrol area and why it sank off the coast of Hawaii. I recommend reading both books.

THE BOARD OF INQUIRY

The USS Thresher and the USS Scorpion, both nuclear powered submarines, sank five years apart from each other. The USS Thresher was on sea trials after coming out of the shipyard the day before. The USS Scorpion was returning to its homeport after conducting classified operations. The formal inquiry into the loss of the Thresher was very thorough.

The Thresher board clearly stated a conclusive determination of the reason for the loss was not possible. Then the board listed the possible causes for the loss and the probability for each possible cause. The board even went so far as to examine inquiry reports for other submarine accidents that could explain Thresher’s loss. The formal report on the flooding incident on the USS Barbel is included in the record of the investigation into the Thresher’s loss.

The investigation into the loss of the Scorpion was not as all inclusive as the investigation into the Thresher. Also, large parts of the investigation and report into the loss of the Scorpion was immediately classified as secret. The declassification of parts of the investigation and the report has been very slow; even now 44 years after the accident (and 21 years after the last Skipjack class submarine, the USS Scamp, was decommissioned) many parts of the report and investigation remain classified. As best as can be determined, no other submarine accidents were looked at for possible explanations to the loss of the USS Scorpion.

One person involved in the investigation, Dr. John Craven, started with the theory that one of Scorpion’s own weapons sank the Scorpion. Armed with a theory, Dr. Craven then examined the evidence looking for support for his theory. Not a very good way to do research.

THE DISASTER THEORIES

A TORPEDO SANK SCORPION: This is a popular theory, both one of Scorpion’s own weapons or the torpedo of another ship. There are SOSUS recordings of the loss of the Scorpion. The navy also conducted experiments with explosives in the area where the Scorpion sank and compared those SOSUS recordings with the SOSUS recordings from the loss of the Scorpion. Explosive charges that most closely resemble the actually sounds of the Scorpion’s demise are less than one tenth the power of any charge carried on any torpedo the US or Soviet navies had. Also, when you compare the time interval between the first acoustic event and the last acoustic event; it matches the expected time interval between the implosion of the operations compartment at crush depth and the Scorpion hitting the ocean floor.

FLOODING THROUGH THE TRASH DISPOSAL UNIT: One problem with this theory, but it is a big problem. Only one compartment imploded on the Scorpion, the operations compartment. An implosion is caused by the pressure difference between the pressure inside a compartment and the pressure outside the compartment, exceeding the strength of the hull. If the operations compartment was flooding, the pressure inside the operations compartment would be increasing as water flooded in and it would not implode. The torpedo room and the engine room did not implode, but the operations compartment did. Conclusion, there was flooding in the engine room and the torpedo room, but not the operations compartment. Therefore, there was no flooding through the trash disposal unit, which was in the operations compartment.

SCORPION WAS SUNK BY THE SOVIETS: Scorpion could not have been sunk by a Soviet torpedo or depth charge for the same reason it could not have been sunk by one of its own torpedoes. Also, the Scorpion could not have been sunk by a collision because there is no collision damage or external explosion damage on the Scorpion wreckage.

THE SCORPION LOST ITS PROPELLER SHAFT AND FLOODED THROUGH THE OPENING: The newest theory. The entire propeller shaft of the Scorpion, with its propeller attached, is near the Scorpion’s engine room on the ocean floor. There have been submarines that have lost their propeller or propeller shaft. However, no submarine has ever lost the entire propeller shaft. The entire propeller shaft of the Scorpion was pushed out of the ship when the engine room telescoped into the auxiliary machinery space. All of the equipment cannot occupy the same space. As the engine room telescoped into the auxiliary machinery space, compacting equipment together from the two spaces, the propeller shaft was pushed out of the ship. The engine room did not implode, so we know there was flooding in the engine room. The flooding could have come through the shaft seals around the propeller shaft, but the propeller shaft was still very much in the ship until the engine room telescope into the auxiliary machinery space. If not, the ship would have taken on so much water, and sunk so fast, that the torpedo room would also have imploded. Which it did not.

CONCLUSION: The Scorpion sank due to uncontrolled flooding. The flooding was either in the torpedo room or the engine room. The Scorpion had a leak through the propeller shaft seals which was repaired by the submarine tender. The captain of the Scorpion also wanted valves on the torpedo tubes replaced. It is possible that either of these caused the uncontrolled flooding. Then as the Scorpion descended into the depths, the other compartment began to flood through the already mentioned previous problem area. During the descent the submarine passed through the crush depth for the operations compartment, causing the total destruction of the operations compartment.

There are a thousand ways the Scorpion could have sank, however there is only one way the Scorpion actually did sink. Change anything in the sequence of events of the Scorpion’s loss, and you change the debris field as we see it today. The wreckage of the Scorpion, in the ship and in the debris field, will tell us exactly what happened to the ship and in what order. We need to examine that evidence slowly, thoughtfully, and thoroughly.

Several expeditions have gone to the USS Scorpion wreck site, collecting thousands of still photographs and hundreds of hours of film footage. Yet, the navy has released only a small fraction of this photographic evidence and maintains it has released all the photographic evidence it has. What the navy has released is less what was collected on just one expedition. The time has come for the navy to declassify everything it has on the loss of the USS Scorpion. The navy needs to release all the evidence, including photographic evidence it has in its possession. The time has come for us to recreate the events as they happened using all the evidence, so that these men may rest in peace and their families may find peace and closure.

To read part one click here: http://wp.me/p1MLkF-EP

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USS Scorpion SSN-589 Part One


USS Scorpion SSN-589 Part One.

The history, the loss, the theories, the future of the USS Scorpion SSN-589.

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USS Scorpion SSN-589 Part One


US Navy 110315-N-3442D-059 Religious Program S...

This flag at half-mast is presented here in honor of the 99 men still on patrol on the USS Scorpion. US Navy 110315-N-3442D-059 Religious Program Specialist 2nd Class Calvin Do, left, Yeoman 1st Class Leviticus McNeal, center, and Mass Communicatio (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Scorpion Launch

DISCLAIMER

All of the information in this article comes from unclassified sources. In those instances where the I know more accurate information due to my security clearance and service in the United States Navy submarine force I have used the published unclassified information instead. I do this to protect the lives and missions of those men and women currently serving in the United States submarine force.

BACKGROUND

On Memorial Day 27 May 1968 the USS Scorpion was scheduled to arrive at its home port of Norfolk, Virginia. The families of the crew of the USS Scorpion waited in the storm at pier 22, but the USS Scorpion never arrived. The families were told to go home. Only then, through news outlets, did the families learn that the USS Scorpion was missing. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, declared the USS Scorpion presumed lost with all hands on 5 June 1968. The Scorpion was stricken from the register of United States Naval ships on 30 June 1968. The reason for the loss of the USS Scorpion has never been conclusively determined. There are many theories for the loss; this article will examine those theories and the actions of the navy that concern the loss of the ship and the investigation into the loss of the ship.

The USS Scorpion was the third of six Skipjack class submarines built from 1956 to 1961. The Scorpion construction began with the laying down of the keel on 20 August 1958. The ship first became water borne with its launching on 29 December 1959. The Scorpion became an official part of the United States Navy with its commissioning on 29 July 1960.

Skipjack class submarines were 252 feet long, 31 feet wide. They used a S5W nuclear reactor for propulsion and electrical power, creating 15,000 shaft horsepower on one shaft. Skipjack class submarines displace 3,000 tons on the surface and 3,500 tons submerged. Surfaced speed was 15 knots and submerged speed was 33 knots. Normal crew was 80 to 90 men with 8 to 10 of these being officers (the Scorpion had 99 men onboard at the time of her loss). These ships had 6 torpedo tubes in the bow and could carry a variety of torpedoes. At the time of the loss of the of the USS Scorpion she was carrying, MK 14 torpedoes, MK 37 electric torpedoes, and two MK 45 nuclear torpedoes, all three torpedoes are no longer used in the United States Navy. The MK 45 torpedo, if used, would destroy both the target and the ship launching it; the blast radius was greater than the range of the torpedo itself.

USS Scorpion

USS Scorpion (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

In June 1963, the Scorpion entered the shipyard for a routine eleven-month overhaul in Charleston, South Carolina. From February to July 1967, the Scorpion went through a second abbreviated overhaul (at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard) instead of the full overhaul it was scheduled for. These were the only two overhauls the Scorpion had. The Charleston, South Carolina shipyard performed the first overhaul. It was the first time the shipyard had overhauled a nuclear powered submarine. There were many problems found with the Scorpion, of particular concern were the many bad welds found in the piping systems on board.

Bad welds and pipes that were brazed instead of welded, are believed to be the cause for the loss of the USS Thresher on 10 April 1963. After the loss of the Thresher, a change to submarine construction dictated that any pipe subjected to sea pressure could no longer be brazed and was required to be welded.

David L. McDonald, 17th Chief of Naval Operations

David L. McDonald, 17th Chief of Naval Operations (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Admiral David Lamar McDonald (the Chief of Naval Operations in 1966) on 17 June 1966 approved a reduced overhaul for the USS Scorpion (from 36 months to 6 months). Admiral McDonald also approved the postponement of the SUBSAFE improvements on the Scorpion which had been scheduled for this overhaul. The SUBSAFE program came from the loss of the USS Thresher, and improved the safety of the Navy’s submarines to prevent a similar loss; in 1963, these improvements were declared essential. At the time of the loss of the Scorpion 4 of the 60 submarines in the Navy had been given waivers to allow them to continue to operate without these SUBSAFE changes. USS Scorpion was one of those four submarines.

The shortened overhaul has been a frequent topic, most often attributed to the cost. Due to the loss of the Thresher and the new SUBSAFE program, overhauls had gone from 11months to 36 months. This was an incredible increase in costs. However, the real concern of the commander of the Atlantic force submarines was the offline time (in the late 1960’s this was 40% of the total available duty time). This was the second decade of the Cold War and the Vietnam War was in its third year. Due to the Vietnam War effort, defense department budgets were centered around the Army. The submarine force took a backseat to the war effort in Asia, and yet still had to meet the Soviet threat while also conducting intelligence operations for the United States. SUBLANT (the most senior admiral in the Atlantic submarine force) and the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations, the most senior admiral in the United States Navy) were looking for ways to decrease nuclear submarine offline time (overhaul, repairs and upkeep), and increase the on duty time (time on patrol and available for patrol). After the loss of the Scorpion the longer overhauls were re-instituted, and the SUBSAFE improvements were completed on the remaining three submarines.

The Scorpion had chronic problems with its hydraulic system throughout its career, beginning when it was turned over to the Navy in 1960. The hydraulic system operates the rudder, stern planes (wing like, near the rudder for control depth), and fairwater planes (wing like, on the sail or conning tower to control depth), as well as other vital pieces of equipment on board. When the Scorpion left Norfolk on patrol on 15 February 1968, it had a hydraulic leak in the area of the sail, of 50 gallons an hour (yes that’s right fifty gallons an hour). Mysteriously, during its transit across the Atlantic to the Mediterranean the leak stopped. The crew was uncertain as to the cause, but they believed the leak was from the fairwater planes.

The USS Scorpion had a number of material problems after its second overhaul when it left the Norfolk Naval Shipyard in July 1967. The nuclear reactor and its systems were given excellent attention by the shipyard, but work on the rest of the ships systems, which would normally be done by the shipyard, fell to the ship’s crew and a submarine tender (a submarine maintenance ship). The USS Scorpion crew was working 12 hours a day while the ship was in the shipyard, often manufacturing parts they could not get through normal channels. One crewman said that the crew called the USS Scorpion the USS Scrap-Iron, he went on to say that the crew would work all day on a piece of equipment and it was still in bad shape at the end of the day. This same crewman said they (the crew not the shipyard workers) were giving the Scorpion an overhaul without spare parts.

The first post-overhaul problem was a seawater leak through the shaft seals (a seal that keeps out seawater while allowing the propeller shaft to rotate). Next, in November 1967, the USS Scorpion was on a high-speed run when it began to corkscrew through the water so bad that equipment began swaying on the rubber mounts. Scorpion was put into drydock, but the cause of the severe corkscrew effect was never determined. This problem was mentioned during the investigation into the loss of the Scorpion with conflicting explanations and has never been fully explained.

USS Scorpion sail

USS Scorpion sail (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

During Scorpion’s deployment to the Mediterranean, many of the ship’s crew wrote, in their letters home, of numerous problems with equipment on the Scorpion. In one letter, a crewman wrote that they had repaired, replaced or jury-rigged every piece of equipment on board the ship. When Scorpion’s new radio chief arrived at the ship in Rota, Spain, he wrote home that on his arrival every piece of communications equipment was broken and the radiomen were attempting repairs. On 23 March 1968, five weeks after leaving Norfolk for the Mediterranean, the commanding officer wrote a request for emergency repairs, to his senior officers. He went on to say that a delay in the repairs would seriously jeopardize the Scorpion’s material readiness.

Another of the problems plaguing the ship was a freon leak in the ship’s refrigeration system. The Scorpion also had a fire in an escape trunk cause by a seawater leak that sprayed seawater on shore power connections. The Scorpion, at the time of its loss, has so many leaks its maximum safe operating depth was restricted to 300 feet, even though it was originally designed to go more than 2000 feet deep safely.

Of the many items the Commanding Officer, Francis Slattery, wanted replaced was the propeller, the drain valves on the torpedo tubes, and several valves connected with the ship’s drain system. The ship’s drain system allowed water to be pumped out of the ship to sea. Several of these valves leaked water at sea pressure, and sprayed the drain pump with seawater creating a fire hazard as well possibly disabling the drain pump. During flooding this pump is used to pump the floodwaters out of the ship.

One other ship system I wish to comment on, is the ship’s EMBT (Emergency Main Ballast Tank blow system). This is the system that when operated is supposed to blow all water out of the main ballast tanks in an emergency, causing the submarine to surface. The system can be operated from one location. The EMBT did not work on the Thresher, water vapor in the air caused the ice to form in the valve blocking air from the main ballast tanks. The Charleston shipyard and SUBLANT argued about this system on the Scorpion. The shipyard claimed the system worked as advertised and the Navy claimed it did not. As a result, the system was tagged out at the time of Scorpion’s loss, just one more system that was scheduled for a SUBSAFE upgrade that never happened.

During the Court of Inquiry into the loss of the USS Scorpion, the officers on the investigation board were never given information on the true physical condition of the ship. The board wrote in its conclusions that USS Scorpion was in “excellent” condition at the time of its loss. Through no fault of the board, this was not an accurate statement.

LAST PHOTO OF MISSING SUBMARINE 1968. Did a ba...

LAST PHOTO OF MISSING SUBMARINE 1968. Did a battle between the American sub and a Soviet sub take place? (Photo credit: roberthuffstutter)

THE LAST PATROL

The USS Scorpion was not originally scheduled for a Mediterranean patrol in 1968, the USS Seawolf (SSN-575) was. The USS Seawolf  was unable to make its deployment due to damage in an accident, and the assignment was given to the USS Scorpion. This is not the navy’s new USS Seawolf SSN-21. This is the only submarine the United States Navy built with a liquid metal cooled (sodium) nuclear reactor, the same type of reactor that the Soviet Union would use thirty years later for its Alfa class submarines. From 12 December 1958 until 30 September 1960 the Seawolf was in the shipyard having her liquid metal cooled reactor replaced with a more conventional reactor.

On 30 January 1968, two weeks before she was supposed to leave for a Mediterranean patrol, the Seawolf ran aground off the coast of Maine. The Seawolf was towed back to the shipyard for repairs and did not go to sea again until 30 March 1969.

Meanwhile, the USS Scorpion, in place of the disabled USS Seawolf, departed Norfolk on schedule on 15 February 1968. While on this last patrol the USS Scorpion made port visits to Rota, Spain; Taranto, Italy; Augusta Bay, Sicily; Naples, Italy; and again to Rota, Spain. While in the Mediterranean the USS Scorpion performed numerous NATO operations as well as other classified operations for the United States. When the Scorpion left Rota the second time on 16 May to come back to the United States, they left two crewmembers behind to fly back to the United States; one for personal health reasons and the other for a family emergency. These men were among the families waiting for the Scorpion to return to pier 22 in Norfolk on 27 May 1968.

Two other crewmen managed to get transferred from the Scorpion permanently just before the ship left for the Mediterranean. One, electrician’s mate Dan Rogers was on the submarine USS Lapon at sea on 27 May 1968 when the USS Scorpion was declared overdue. The USS Lapon was part of the massive search effort to find the USS Scorpion.

On entering the Atlantic Ocean the USS Scorpion supposedly was being trailed by a Soviet Echo II class submarine. Supposedly, the Scorpion sent a radio message that it could not break away from the trailing submarine.

During the USS Scorpion’s transit back to Norfolk, and after picking up a trailing Soviet submarine, she was sent on a highly classified mission to investigate a task force of Soviet warships near the Canary Islands, close to the US Navy’s SOSUS underwater listening hydrophones.

After completing this mission, the Scorpion resumed its transit home. The Scorpion then attempted to get into radio contact with SUBLANT, but unable to establish communications. The Scorpion then radioed the Naval Station in Greece, which forwarded the message. This was the last message received from the USS Scorpion.

Next Sunday this article will continued with: the discovery that the USS Scorpion is missing, the search for the USS Scorpion, the official inquiry into the loss of the USS Scorpion, and some of the many theories on the loss of the USS Scorpion.

Insignia of USS Scorpion

Insignia of USS Scorpion (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

To read part two click here: http://wp.me/p1MLkF-Fw

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What do you think sank the USS Scorpion ?


I have always felt that the families and friends of the men of the USS Scorpion have a right to know what happened to their loved ones. As a submarine veteran, I have always wanted to know what happened to my shipmates (all submariners are shipmates and any submariner will tell you this). I want to know so that we can make sure it never happens again.  I have started my research into what sank the USS Scorpion. I do not know how long this will take, Titanic took more than 20 years. I would  to take a poll as I begin my research, thank you.

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Commander John Edward Smith: Captain R.M.S. Titanic


Statue of Captain Edward Smith in Beacon Park,...

Statue of Captain Edward Smith in Beacon Park, Lichfield (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Sunday’s article, Titanic: The HMS Hawke, The SS New York, & Captain Smith, will introduce you to a side of Captain Smith no one has seen for 100 years.

Walter Lord said that “… ships had gotten too big for Captain Smith.” The celebrated Titanic author said that Captain Smith wandered away in a daze after the disaster, and described Captain Smith as indecisive.

One blogger on wordpress wrote such a tirade on Captain Smith it hurt my eyes just reading it.

For 100 years Captain Smith has been maligned. Now you will discover the rest of Captain Smith’s story, and you will discover why so many have gotten Captain Smith wrong.

The evidence has been right in front of our eyes for 100 years. It needed a mariner and researcher to identify the clues and point them out for the rest of the world to see.

Nothing surmised or made up, just connecting the dots of over looked and seemingly meaningless actions, misunderstood evidence, and testimony.

Authors and researchers describe Captain Smith as a man admired and respected by subordinates, peers, seniors, and passengers alike. They describe how Captain Smith never raised his voice with subordinates, and yet was always, willingly, and enthusiastically obeyed by juniors. Then they proceed to describe him as outdated and indecisive during the disaster.

There is a reason professional mariners admired, respected, and enthusiastically followed Captain Smith; and this Sunday’s article will reveal those reason’s to you.

Edward J. Smith, captain of the Titanic

Edward J. Smith, captain of the Titanic (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

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